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Abstract
The ability of public policies to secure the economic and social rights recognized in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is proposed as a trumping supplement to the utility-
maximization criterion of neo-classical welfare economics.  Two progressive proposals for 
ending poverty and promoting personal development and freedom are then compared using this 
assessment criterion.  The first proposal is that society guarantee everyone an unconditional basic 
income (BI) without imposing work requirements in exchange for the guarantee.  The second 
proposal is that society use direct job creation to provide employment assurance (EA) for anyone 
who is unable to find decent work in the economy’s regular labor market.  The cost of equally 
expansive versions of the two strategies is compared along with their ability to achieve other 
policy goals.  It is argued that a BI guarantee would be far more expensive than the EA strategy 
as a means of securing the right to income recognized in the Universal Declaration, that a BI 
guarantee would not provide an adequate substitute for securing the right to work, and that most 
of the other benefits a BI guarantee would produce could be better achieved at less cost by using 
the EA strategy supplemented by conventional income transfer programs.  Based on this analysis 
it is argued that efforts to promote the BI idea as a solution to the problems of unemployment 
and poverty in market societies should be rejected.  On the other hand, less expensive versions of 
the BI idea could make a valuable contribution to the design of income transfer measures as long 
as they were not treated as a substitute for policies designed to secure the right to work and 
income support recognized in the Universal Declaration.
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Introduction
There has been a marked trend towards the promotion of work as an anti-poverty strategy 
in market economies over the past several decades.  One of the manifestations of this trend has 
been the tendency for governments increasingly to condition the receipt of public assistance on 
work effort – a policy commonly referred to as “workfare.”2
Ironically, this trend has occurred during a period when the capacity of market economies 
to provide work for everyone who wants its has diminished rather than increased.  In the United 
States, for example, the national unemployment rate – which averaged just over 5 percent from 
1946 through 1979 – rose to average just under 7 percent during the next 16 years, the period 
during which the workfare revolution swept the country.3  The linkage between workfare reforms 
and rising unemployment is even stronger in other countries.4  Moreover, even when 
unemployment rates decline to levels widely viewed as cause for celebration, a sizable job gap is 
likely to remain in market economies.  The size of this job gap in the United States is shown in 
Figure 1 which compares the number of job vacancies in the nation to the number of jobless 
individuals actively looking for work (official unemployment), the number of persons who are 
working part-time but want full time jobs (involuntary part-time workers), and the number of 
discouraged workers (persons who want a job but are not actively looking for one).  The data 
series begins in December 2000 when the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics first began reporting 
the results of its new Job Openings and Labor Turnover (JOLTS) survey.  Figure 1 shows that 
even then, when the nation’s unemployment rate was below 4 percent, there were over a million 
1
 Associate Professor of Law and Economics, Rutgers School of Law - Camden.
2
 For a detailed account of this trend in the United States and Western Europe, see JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL 
CITIZENSHIP AND WORKFARE IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE (2004).
3
 This shift in public policy was heavily promoted by conservatives during the 1980s in books such as GEORGE 
GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY (1981), which President Recommended that his Cabinet read, CHARLES A. 
MURRAY, LOSING GROUND, AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980 (1984), and LAWRENCE M. MEADE, BEYOND 
ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (1986).  It lead in 1988 to the addition of work 
requirements to the Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), see Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988), and reached its culmination with a major overhaul of U.S. public assistance law 
in 1996, the centerpiece of which was the replacement AFDC with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Family 
(TANF) program.  See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
4 See, e.g., HANDLER, supra note 2, at 95-208.
3more officially unemployed workers than there were job openings, and if we count involuntary 
part-time workers and discouraged workers, the economy was short almost 8.5 million jobs. 
Source: Author’s calculations from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics data available at http://bls.gov/ .
Policy analysts and policy advocates on the left (a group I shall refer to as 
“progressives”) have been strongly critical of the workfare trend, viewing it as illogical and 
immoral to impose work requirements on the poor when the economy is unable to provide work 
for everyone who wants it and fails to offer decent work to millions of employed low wage 
workers.5
5
 Handler’s book, id., exemplifies this literature.  For links to progressive policy research and advocacy 
organizations that have addressed this issue, see Moving Ideas, The Electronic Policy Network, Liberal Links, 
Poverty and Wealth, available at http://www.movingideas.org/links/welfarelinks.html .
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4In this article, I compare two of the more expansive strategies proposed by progressives 
in recent years as an alternative strategy for responding to the linked problems of poverty and 
unemployment in market societies.  The first proposal is that society guarantee all its members 
an unconditional basic income (BI) without imposing any work requirements in exchange for the 
guarantee.  As explained on the web site of the U.S. Basic Income Guarantee Network,
[A] Basic Income Guarantee (BIG) is a government ensured guarantee that no 
one’s income will fall below the level necessary to meet their most basic needs for 
any reason. As Bertrand Russell put it in 1918, "A certain small income, sufficient 
for necessities, should be secured for all, whether they work or not, and that a 
larger income ... should be given to those who are willing to engage in some work 
which the community recognizes as useful. On this basis we may build further." 
Thus, with BIG no one is destitute but everyone has the positive incentive to 
work. BIG is an efficient, effective, and equitable solution to poverty that 
promotes individual freedom and leaves the beneficial aspects of a market 
economy in place.6
As the reference to Bertrand Russell in this quote illustrates, guaranteed income proposals have a 
long history,7 but the contemporary BI advocacy movement originated in Western Europe only 
in the mid-1980s.8  Despite its relatively recent origins, however, the movement has grown 
rapidly during the past two decades and now commands support from a wide array of left 
libertarians, anti-poverty advocates, feminists, and greens around the world.9
6
 U.S. Basic Income Guarantee Network, What Is the Basic Income Guarantee?, available at
http://www.widerquist.com/usbig/ .
7 See Philippe Van Parijs, A Short History of Basic Income, available at
http://www.etes.ucl.ac.be/BIEN/BI/HistoryBI.htm .
8
 Basic Income European Network (BIEN), A Short History of BIEN, available at
http://www.etes.ucl.ac.be/BIEN/BIEN/HistoryBIEN.htm .
9 Philippe Van Parijs, a philosopher who teaches at the Catholic University of Louvain in Belgium, and Guy 
Standing, the Director of the Socio-Economic Security Program of the International Labor Organization are widely 
regarded as the leading contemporary exponents of the BI idea.  See PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS, REAL FREEDOM FOR ALL: 
WHAT (IF ANYTHING) CAN JUSTIFY CAPITALISM? (1995); PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS, WHAT’S WRONG WITH A FREE 
LUNCH (2000); GUY STANDING, BEYOND THE NEW PATERNALISM: BASIC SECURITY AS EQUALITY (2002).  
American legal scholars who have endorsed BI proposals include Joel Handler and Anne Alstott.  See JOEL F. 
HANDLER, SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP AND WORKFARE IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE: THE PARADOX OF 
INCLUSION 272-78 (2004); Anne Alstott, Work vs. Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to Employment Subsidies  108 
YALE L.J. 967-1058 (1999).  Links to BI advocacy web sites around the world and extensive bibliographies on the 
subject of BI guarantees can be found at the websites of both the Basic Income European Network (BIEN) 
<http://www.basicincome.org> and the U.S. Basic Income Guarantee Network (USBIG) <http://www.usbig.net>.
5A BI guarantee could be provided in various ways, but the two most frequently proposed 
mechanisms are a negative income tax and a universal grant system.10  A negative income tax 
would pay benefits only to persons whose income fell below a specified level.  The size of the BI
grant therefore would vary depending on the recipient’s income from other sources.  With a 
universal grant system, the same BI benefit would be paid to all persons regardless of their 
income, though assuming the benefit was funded with income tax receipts, persons in higher tax 
brackets would pay more to fund the system than the BI grant they received from it.11
The second progressive reform proposal discussed in this article is that society guarantee 
jobs to everyone who is unable to find work in the regular labor market.  Like guaranteed income 
proposals, guaranteed work proposals have a long history.12  It was, for example, a key 
component of what William Forbath has called the “New Deal Constitution of Social 
Citizenship.”13  President Roosevelt’s Committee on Economic Security explained the proposal 
in the following terms in 1935.14
10
 For discussions of the similarities and differences between a negative income tax and universal grant system, see
Philippe Van Parijs, Basic Income: A Simple and Powerful Idea for the 21st Century, in REDESIGNING 
DISTRIBUTION: BASIC INCOME AND STAKEHOLDER GRANTS AS DESIGNS FOR A MORE EGALITARIAN CAPITALISM 4-
39 (Erik Olin Wright, ed., forthcoming), available at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/RUP-vol-V.pdf ; and Alstott, 
supra note 9. 
 
11
 Royalty payments or other acquisition fees paid to government for the exploitation of publicly owned natural 
resources have been proposed as an alternative source of funding for a BI guarantee, and Alaska actually does 
provide its residents a modest BI grant funded in this manner.  See Scott Goldsmith, The Alaska Permanent Fund 
Dividend: An Experiment in Wealth Redistribution, (paper presented at the 9th International Congress of the Basic 
Income European Network, Geneva, Sept. 12-14, 2002), available at
http://www.etes.ucl.ac.be/BIEN/Files/Papers/2002Goldsmith.pdf . 
12 See RICHARD LEWIS SIEGEL, EMPLOYMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION 23-71 (1994); 
Philip Harvey, The History of Right to Work Claims (Rutgers-Camden Series of Occasional Papers No. 1, 1998), 
available at http://www-camlaw.rutgers.edu/faculty/occasional/1-harvey.html
13
 William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L.R. 
1821, 1831-35 (2001).
14
 This committee was appointed in 1935 to recommend legislation that would provide the American people a 
“safeguard against misfortunes which cannot be wholly eliminated in this man-made world of ours.”  Committee on 
Economic Security, Letter of Transmital, January 15, 1935, reprinted in NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOCIAL 
WELFARE, THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY OF 1935 AND OTHER BASIC DOCUMENTS 
RELATING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 17-18 (1985).  The Committee was chaired by 
Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins and, in addition, consisted of Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr., 
Attorney General Homer Cummings, Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace, and Federal Emergency Relief 
Administrator Harry Hopkins.  In addition to its employment assurance proposal, the Committee proposed the 
establishment of the nation’s Social Security and Unemployment Insurance (UI) Programs, the means-tested Old 
Age Assistance program that now forms a part of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, the Aid for 
Dependent Children program which was latter renamed Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and the 
U.S. Public Health Service.  The Committee also supported the establishment of a national health insurance program 
that would provide both wage replacement and medical insurance benefits, though it did not propose a specific 
program for achieving that goal.  See id. at 21-27. 
6Since most people must live by work, the first objective in a program of economic 
security must be maximum employment.15  As the major contribution of the 
Federal Government to providing a save guard against unemployment we suggest 
employment assurance – the stimulation of private employment and the provision 
of public employment for those able-bodied workers whom industry cannot 
employ at a given time. 
In recent years guaranteed employment proposals have been promoted by anti-poverty 
analysts as a means of providing employment opportunities for disadvantaged population 
groups,16 by post-Keynesian economists as a means of achieving full employment with price 
stability,17 and by human rights advocates as a means of securing the right to work.18  Out of 
deference to the New Deal tradition that preceded them, and because no common term has 
gained wide acceptance in describing these proposals, I shall refer to them as employment 
assurance (EA) measures.  
In keeping with the structure of ordinary political debate, most scholarly assessments of 
public policy reform proposals involve comparisons of proposals that reflect opposing 
ideological perspectives.  The proposals being assessed are compared either to a conflicting 
status quo or to competing reform proposals drawn from the other end of the political spectrum.  
Comparisons of this type are important because they highlight the conflicts that drive the 
political process out of which public policy emerges.  But comparative assessments of reform 
proposals that draw their support from the same end of the political spectrum also are important.  
for the development and refinement of those proposals.  
15
 By “maximum employment” the Committee meant what latter came to be termed “full employment.”  The latter 
term, although occasionally used by professional economists, had not yet entered popular currency in 1935.  See
Philip Harvey Combating Joblessness: An Analysis of the Principal Strategies That Have Influenced the 
Development of American Employment and Social Welfare Law During the 20th Century, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 675, 705 n. 97. 
16 DAVID R. REIMER, THE PRISONERS OF WELFARE: LIBERATING AMERICA’S POOR FROM UNEMPLOYMENT AND LOW 
WAGES (1988); MICKEY KAUS, THE END OF EQUALITY (1992); David T. Ellwood and Elisabeth Welty, Public 
Service Employment and Mandatory Work: A Policy Whose Time Has Come and Gone and Come Again?,  in
FINDING JOBS (David E. Card and Rebecca M. Blank, eds., 2000); TIMOTHY J. BARTIK, JOBS FOR THE POOR: CAN
LABOR DEMAND POLICIES HELP? (2002).
17 HYMAN MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY (1986); William F. Mitchell and Martin Watts, The Path 
to Full Employment 31 AUSTRALIAN ECON. REV. 436-444 (1997); Warren Mosler, Full Employment and Price 
Stability 20 J. POST-KEYNESIAN ECON. 167-82 (1997); RANDALL WRAY, UNDERSTANDING MODERN MONEY: THE 
KEY TO FULL EMPLOYMENT AND PRICE STABILITY (1998); Mathew Forstater, Flexible Full Employment: Structural 
Implications of Discretionary Public Sector Employment J. ECON. ISSUES 557-563 (1998).
18 PHILIP HARVEY, SECURING THE RIGHT TO EMPLOYMENT: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY AND THE UNEMPLOYED IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1989); Wendell Gordon, Job Assurance – the Job Guarantee Revisited 31 J. ECON. ISSUES 826-34 
(1997); WILLIAM P. QUIGLEY, ENDING POVERTY AS WE KNOW IT (2003).
7Why is debate among “friends” needed to achieve this goal?  Why not test policy 
proposals exclusively against the policies they are designed to counter or replace?  First, it’s not 
an either or choice.  The issue is not whether debate across the ideological divides that shape 
political conflicts in the real world is important.  It obviously is.  The issue is whether debate 
among ideological colleagues is likely to be helpful in different ways.  I believe it is.
Ideological colleagues share values and are likely to share methodological understandings 
as well.  For that reason they are more likely to find one another’s contributions to a particular 
policy debate persuasive, or at least helpful, than they are the contributions of their ideological 
opponents.  People who speak the same language not only communicate more easily with one 
another but also with greater subtlety.  They literally can say things to one another that they 
cannot communicate to people who do not speak the same language.  The social sciences rarely 
produce paradigms that command enough support to permit what Thomas Kuhn famously 
characterized as “normal science” within an entire discipline,1 but discussion and debate among 
scholars and policy advocates who share a common perspective perform a similar function in 
facilitating research that expands particular areas of knowledge and supports the development of 
more sophisticated policy proposals addressing problems in those areas. 
My allusion to Kuhn in the preceding paragraph suggests, the importance I attach to the 
development of a distinctively progressive methodological approach for analyzing economic and 
social policy issues.  As Anne Alstott has noted, 
In philosophy and constitutional law, liberalism occupies center state.  In those 
fields, the great debates ponder the meaning of freedom and equality and the 
scope of individuals’ rights against the collective.  But when it come to taxes and 
transfers, liberal principles of distributive justice give way to utilitarian talk of 
costs and benefits, incentives and disincentives.19
She proposes to infuse economic and social policy debate with the progressive values that 
dominate discussions of moral philosophy and constitutional law by using the “core liberal 
values of individualism, freedom, and equality” to supplement the goal of utility maximization 
and, in the case of conflicts, to trump the utility maximization goal.20  But how does one 
concretize the values of individualism, freedom and equality?  Neo-classical economics has 
devoted well over a century to the methodological development of the utility maximization 
criterion precisely because it cannot be directly applied to policy questions.
To apply liberal or other progressive values to the analysis of public policy questions an 
analytic methodology is needed.  As Alstott notes, progressive scholars have developed such a 
19
 Alstott, supra, note 9 at 973.
20 Id.
8methodology in philosophy and constitutional law, and in her own comparison of wage subsidy 
and BI proposals, she relies mainly on the former tradition.  She applies the arguments of liberal 
philosophers and political theorists such as John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Bruce Ackerman and 
especially Philippe Van Parijs to assess the relative ability of the two policies she discusses.  I 
am sympathetic to this undertaking, but I also find it awkward.  It is difficult to imagine lawyers 
and legal scholars becoming adept at this form of argument.  I think it more likely that they will 
get bogged down in philosophical debates that are peripheral to their main concerns
The field of constitutional law demonstrates that where an authoritative legal text exists 
that is presumed to embody widely-accepted values and whose provisions are expected to be 
interpreted in accord with those values, it generally is easier and more persuasive to ask whether 
a particular policy is consistent with the text than to reason directly from the philosophical 
principles that underlie the text.  The reason Alstott does not employ this methodology is 
probably because the U.S. Constitution is notoriously obscure (and arguably thin) in the support 
it provides for the application of progressive values in the fields of economic and social policy.
William Forbath has labored mightily to resurrect a more progressive understanding of 
the U.S. Constitution,21 and Cass Sunstein, has recently lent his support to that effort.22  This 
work is useful, but it labors under the necessity of transforming current understandings of the 
Constitution’s limitations before it can even begin the task of articulating what a progressive 
reading of the Constitution would tell us.
I believe there is a more suitable text, indeed a series of texts, upon which progressives 
can rely in translating their core values into economic and social policy norms and mandates.  I 
have in mind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights 
agreements and declarations which, like the Universal Declaration, expressly recognize the 
existence of economic and social human rights.23  Indeed, American progressives have more 
reason than most to lay claim to the values embodied in the Universal Declaration, since its 
economic and social provisions owe a great deal to the influence of the U.S. progressive 
tradition.
21 See William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1999); William E. Forbath, 
Civil Rights and Economic Citizenship: Notes on the Past and Future of the Civil Rights and Labor Movements 2 U. 
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 967 (2000); Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights, supra note 13; William E. Forbath, The 
New Deal Constitution in Exile 51 DUKE L.J. 165 (2001); William E. Forbath, The Politics of Constitutional Design: 
Obduracy and Amendmendability – A Comment on Ferejohn and Sager 81 TEX. L. REV. 1965 (2003); William E. 
Forbath, Not So Simple Justice: Frank Michelman on Social Rights, 1969 – Present, 39 TULSA L. REV. 597 (2004).
22 See CASS SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT 
MORE THAN EVER (2004).
23
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).  Other 
international human rights agreements and declarations with strong socio-economic provisions include [***] 
9Forbath has traced the development of “social citizenship” rights in embodied in what he 
refers to as the “New Deal Constitution.”     “Social Constitution” developed by American 
progressives during the New Deal era,24 explained why they sought to implement its provisions 
politically rather than by Constitutional amendment,25 and also explained why the New Dealer’s 
political strategy failed because of the entrenched opposition of southern Democrats intent on 
preserving Jim Crow.26  Forbath describes the New Deal Constitution as having gone into “exile” 
following this defeat, where it remains today awaiting restoration by a new generation of 
progressives.27
A carefully elaborated description of the institutional structure and functions of 
government mandated by the New Dealer’s Social Constitution can be found in the plans for 
post-war reconstruction contained in the 1942 report of the National Resources Planning 
Board.28  It’s most eloquent expression can be found in President Roosevelt’s 1944 State of the 
Union Message.  In that speech the President invoked the natural rights language of the 
Declaration of Independence to argue that the nation’s original Bill of Rights was no longer 
adequate to protect the American People’s right to “equality in the pursuit of happiness.”  He 
called on Congress to give effect to a “second Bill of Rights under which a new basis of security 
and prosperity can be established for all – regardless of station, race or creed.”29  The President’s 
appeal is reproduced in Box 1.
Responding to the President’s appeal, progressives in Congress introduced legislation 
that would have committed the federal government to secure the first of the eight rights 
enumerated in FDR’s proposed “Second Bill of Rights.”  This legislation would have committed 
the federal government to achieve and maintain a permanent state of “full employment,” 
automatically authorizing the expenditure of sufficient funds to attain that goal.30  It was the 
24
 Forbath, Caste, Class and Equal Citizenship, supra note 21, at 23-75.
25
 Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, supra note 21 166 -203. 
26
 Forbath, Caste, Class and Equal Citizenship, supra 21, at 76-85; Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 
supra note 21, at 202-09.
27 Id., at 220-22.
28 See NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANING BOARD, SECURITY, WORK AND RELIEF POLICIES, H.R. Doc. No. 78-128, pt. 3 
(1943).
29
 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 11 1944), reprinted in 13 THE 
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 40-1 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1950).
30 See STEPHEN K. BAILEY, CONGRESS MAKES A LAW: THE STORY BEHIND THE EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1946, at 37-
60 (1950); HARVEY, SECURING THE RIGHT TO EMPLOYMENT, supra note 18, at 106-10.
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BOX 1
FDR’s Proposed Second Bill of Rights
State of the Union Message to Congress, Jan. 11, 1944
We cannot be content, no matter how high [the American] standard of living may be, if some fraction 
of our people—whether it be one-third or one-fifth or one-tenth—is ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-housed, and 
insecure.
This Republic had its beginning, and grew to its present strength, under the protection of certain 
inalienable political rights—among them the right of free speech, free press, free worship, trial by jury, 
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. They were our rights to life and liberty.
As our nation has grown in size and stature, however—as our industrial economy expanded—these 
political rights proved inadequate to assure us equality in the pursuit of happiness.
We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual freedom cannot exist without 
economic security and independence. “Necessitous men are not free men.” People who are hungry and 
out of a job are the stuff of which dictatorships are made.
In our day these economic truths have become accepted as self-evident. We have accepted, so to 
speak, a second Bill of Rights under which a new basis of security and prosperity can be established 
for all—regardless of station, race, or creed.
Among these are:
• The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or mines of the 
nation;
• The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation;
• The right of every farmer to raise and sell his products at a return which will give him and his 
family a decent living;
• The right of every businessman, large and small, to trade in an atmosphere of freedom from 
unfair competition and domination by monopolies at home or abroad;
• The right of every family to a decent home;
• The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health;
• The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, accident, and 
unemployment;
• The right to a good education.
All of these rights spell security. And after this war is won we must be prepared to move forward, in 
the implementation of these rights, to new goals of human happiness and well-being.
America’s own rightful place in the world depends in large part upon how fully these and similar 
rights have been carried into practice for our citizens. 
11
failure of that legislative initiative which signaled the “exile” of the New Deal Constitution to 
which Forbath refers.
What Forbath failed to note is that the New Deal Constitution went into exile in a more 
literal sense, finding the home in international human rights law that it was denied in the United 
States.  Drafted by a Committee chaired by the U.S. Delegate to the United Nations – none other 
than FDR’s widow and progressive tribune, Eleanor Roosevelt – the Universal Declaration fully 
embodies, indeed substantially improves upon FDR’s proposed “Second Bill of Rights” while 
also fully incorporating the progressive civil and political rights found in the U.S. Constitution’s 
original Bill of Rights and Civil War amendments.31  The economic and social provisions of the 
Universal Declaration are reproduced in Box 2.
While fully supporting the efforts of progressive scholars to resurrect the New Deal 
Constitution in American political discourse, I think the Universal Declaration provides a more 
complete and authoritative embodiment of that tradition.  The best way for American 
progressives to “repatriate” their own exiled Constitution would be to begin to use the Universal 
Declaration as a standard for judging the adequacy of progressive policy proposals.  Indeed, this 
is exactly what the Universal Declaration (and arguably the 9th Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution) instructs us to do.
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and 
all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping 
this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to 
promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, 
national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and 
observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the 
peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.32
Accepting this charge, I use the Universal Declaration in this article as a standard for 
judging the relative merits of BI and EA proposals.  I begin by explaining each proposal’s 
contribution to securing the rights recognized in the Universal Declaration.  I then explore the 
relative cost of equally generous versions of the two strategies – initiatives capable of 
eliminating official poverty in the United States.  
This cost comparison is important for two reasons.  The first is because public resources 
are needed not only to secure the rights addressed by BI and EA proposals, but other rights as 
31
 For an account of Eleanor Roosevelt’s role in the drafting and enactment of the Universal Declaration, see MARY 
ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS (2001).  For a detailed legislative history of the Declaration’s specific provisions, see JOHANNES MORSINK, 
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1999).
32
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 23, preamble.
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BOX 2
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Adopted by the General Assembly of the U.N. by a vote of 48 to 0 with 8 abstentions on Dec. 10, 1948
Article 22
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through 
national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each 
State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his 
personality.
Article 23
(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favorable conditions of 
work and to protection against unemployment.
(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favorable remuneration ensuring for himself and his 
family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social 
protection.
(4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
Article 24
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic 
holidays with pay.
Article 25
(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and 
of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to 
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in 
circumstances beyond his control.
(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in 
or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.
Article 26
(1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and 
fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory.  Technical and professional education shall be 
made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.
(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the 
strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance 
and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations 
for the maintenance of peace.
(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.
Article 27
(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts 
and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.
Article 28
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration can be fully realized.
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well.  The second reason is because securing human rights is not the only public policy goal 
societies legitimately can pursue.  Stated differently, efficiency considerations are important to 
the human rights assessment I undertake, but not the form of efficiency employed as a social 
choice criterion in neo-classical welfare economics.  Instead of seeking to maximize aggregate 
utility or one of its stand-ins given society’s available resource base (or, alternatively, to 
minimize the opportunity cost of achieving a given quantum of utility) I apply a different 
efficiency criterion – the minimization of the opportunity cost of securing the economic and 
social rights recognized in the Universal Declaration.  In this way the trumping effect of 
fundamental rights is honored while also seeking to maximize the resources available for the 
pursuit of other goals.
After analyzing the relative cost of BI and EA strategies for eliminating poverty, I 
consider a variety of other social welfare goals that BI advocates claim their proposals would 
advance – compensating unemployed individuals for their lack of paid employment, reducing 
both the administrative burden of providing and the stigma of receiving public assistance 
benefits, compensating people who engage in non-market work for their socially useful labor, 
and promoting personal development and freedom.  After noting that these goals also implicate 
rights recognized in the Universal Declaration, I assess the relative ability of BI and EA 
strategies to produce the desired effects.  
My general conclusion is that the EA strategy supplemented by conventional transfer 
programs would be far less expensive than the BI strategy as a means of eliminating poverty and 
that almost all of the other goals BI advocates promote also could be better achieved at lower 
cost employing the EA strategy.   Nevertheless, I do not reject BI proposals as totally lacking 
merit.  First, I emphasize that there is no theoretical or practical contradiction between BI and 
EA proposals.  Indeed BI, EA, and conventional income transfer programs would complement 
one another.  That said, given the efficiency concerns explained above, I argue that it is doubtful 
the “value added” by a BI guarantee would justify the high cost of the benefit if it were provided 
in the form preferred by most BI advocates.  On the other hand, this disadvantage would not 
apply to less expensive forms of BI guarantee.  In endorse one such proposal – a means-tested 
but not work-tested family income guarantee offered in conjunction with an EA guarantee and 
conventional income transfers.  I believe less expensive BI proposals of this sort deserve a closer 
look by BI advocates and EA advocates alike.  “Work and Freedom” rather than “Work vs. 
Freedom” would be the rallying cry of supporters of this joint strategy.33
33
 In an article bearing the title “Work vs. Freedom,” Alstott argues for the adoption of a BI strategy and the 
rejection of employment subsidies.  See Alstott, supra note 9.  My own choice of title is meant to emphasize the 
compatibility of BI and EA policies.
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The Right to Work and the Right to Income Support
The claim that society has an obligation to guarantee all its members access to the 
material and social supports necessary to maintain a dignified existence is articulated in Articles 
22 and 25 of the Universal Declaration (see Box 2).  The operational content of this broad right 
is specified in these and other articles.34  Two of the entitlements recognized in these articles –
the right to work and the right to income support – comprise the core of the Universal 
Declaration’s guarantee of freedom from poverty.
Article 23 (see Box 2) defines the right to work as a right of access to a freely chosen job 
that provides favorable working conditions and pays wages capable of supporting a dignified 
existence for the worker and the worker’s family,35 including supplementation if needed from 
“other means of social protection.”36  Ensuring that everyone has access to work on these terms 
can be conceived as fulfilling society’s obligation to provide income security for anyone who is 
capable of working and for their dependents.  This is the goal of EA proposals.  
Securing the right to work also can be viewed as important for the achievement of dignity 
and the free development of an individual’s personhood.  Kenneth Karst has made this point in 
the following terms.37  “What happens,” he asks, “to individuals and families when the formal 
freedom to work becomes hollow because stable work with a decent wage, decent health and 
retirement benefits, and access to decent childcare just isn’t available?”  He notes the obvious –
that the family’s income suffers and it may be exposed to material deprivation – but he also 
stresses other harms.
$ If stable, adequately paid work is a source of independence, its absence means 
dependence on others.
$ If stable, adequately paid work is an avenue to personal achievement, its absence 
signifies failure.
$ If stable, adequately paid work offers advancement up the socio-economic ladder, its 
absence means that ones social station is either fixed or in decline.
$ If stable, adequately paid work provides family security, its absence means insecurity.
$ If stable, adequately paid work elicits the esteem of others, its absence means shame.
34
 For guidance concerning the intended meaning of the text’s broad language, see MORSINK,  supra note 31.
35
 The gendered language of the Universal Declaration is not intended to limit the rights it recognizes based either on 
gender or family structure.  Article 2 makes clear that  “[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth 
in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra
note 23, art. 2.
36 Id., art. 23, par. 3.
37
 Kenneth Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 523, 534 (1997).
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Paid employment (whether that employment takes the form of wage employment or self-
employment in either a market or subsistence economy) is not the only source of these benefits.  
But it is an important source, and the Universal Declaration clearly embodies the view that 
society must afford all its members access to the opportunities for self-support and personal 
development that paid employment provides.
For persons who cannot secure an adequate standard of living from paid employment, the 
Universal Declaration recognizes a right to societal support through transfer programs, social 
insurance, or other institutional arrangements that serve the same function.  This entitlement is 
recognized in the 3rd paragraph of Article 23 and the 1st paragraph of Article 25 (see Box 2). 
First, Article 23 unambiguously recognizes that society has a duty to supplement the wages of 
any person whose wages from work are insufficient to support a dignified existence for the 
worker and her family.  Second, Article 25 recognizes that everyone, without qualification, has a 
right to an adequate standard of living “security in the event of unemployment, sickness, 
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond [their] 
control.”38
Thus, the right of all persons to societal support recognized in the Universal Declaration 
is based on two unambiguous operational entitlements. One is a right to work that guarantees all 
persons who want paid employment the opportunity to earn enough (including social 
supplementation if needed) to support themselves and their families.  The other is a right to 
income security for persons who cannot earn a livelihood due to circumstances beyond their 
control.  Article 25 also guarantees all persons an unconditional right to an adequate standard of 
living, but this entitlement is ambiguous with respect to the question that is of most interest to BI 
advocates – whether it includes an obligation on the part of governments to provide income 
support to persons who could be self-supporting through work but choose not to.  Morsink 
argues that the drafters of the Declaration assumed the article would guarantee people the 
“‘opportunity to obtain’ food and housing,” but that “[t]he state is not required to provide food or 
housing unless the individual cannot under existing conditions obtain them by his own efforts.”39
Still, the language of Article 25 could support a broader interpretation of the right, as Guy 
Standing has suggested.40
It also is important to note that while the Universal Declaration does not unambiguously 
recognize a right to income support for persons who are capable of supporting themselves but 
would prefer to engage in other activities, there is nothing in the Declaration suggesting that it 
would be improper for a society to provide its members an unconditional BI guarantee without 
38
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 23, art. 25. 
39 See MORSINK, supra note 31, at 193-94.
40
 Guy Standing, About Time: Basic Income Security as a Right, Paper presented at the 9th International Congress of 
the Basic Income European Network, September 12-14, 2002, Geneva, at 24-25, available at
http://www.etes.ucl.ac.be/BIEN/Files/Papers/2002Standing2.pdf .
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regard to either their ability or inclination to seek available wage employment.  In other words, 
the Universal Declaration provides no support for claims that it would violate the rights of wage 
earners to tax wage income in order to fund a BI guarantee. Moreover, there is no theoretical 
incompatibility between providing an unconditional BI guarantee in conjunction with an EA 
guarantee and programs guaranteeing the right to income security recognized in the Universal 
Declaration.41
Nevertheless, there are practical reasons why BI proposals and EA proposals are likely to 
compete with one another, and BI advocates have tended to be quite critical of proposals to 
secure the right to work.42  A Herculean effort would be required to move society to adopt either 
an unconditional BI guarantee or an effective EA guarantee, so it is only natural for supporters of 
each strategy to ask whether it makes sense to pursue both simultaneously.  If either a BI or an 
EA guarantee were secured, how much additional benefit would the other entitlement provide?  
To the extent they pursue common goals, which policy is likely to be more effective?  These are 
the questions addressed in this article. 
Program Cost
BI proposals and EA proposals both have reputations for being expensive.  This does not 
mean, of course, that the two policies would be equally expensive to implement.  BI advocates 
have argued that an employment guarantee would be more expensive to implement than an 
income guarantee because of the high overhead costs of funding jobs compared to writing BI 
benefit checks.43  BI advocates make three mistakes in drawing this conclusion.  First, they 
overestimate the overhead costs of a job guarantee program by failing to appreciate that in an EA 
program designed to secure the right to work for all job seekers, positions created to perform 
“overhead” functions within the program or to provide services and materials to the program 
would not add significantly to its overall size.  If 100 jobs are needed to close the economy’s job 
gap, that’s how many jobs the program would have to create, and within broad bounds it 
41
 The latter still would be needed even if an unconditional BI guarantee were provided, for reasons discussed 
below.  See infra, at 28-31.
42 See VAN PARIJS, REAL FREEDOM FOR ALL, supra note 9, at 125-126; Karl Widerquist and Michael A. Lewis, An 
Efficiency Argument for the Guaranteed Income, The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Working 
Paper No. 212 (1997); Nanna Kildal, Nanna, The Social Basis of Self-Respect: A Normative Discussion of Policies 
Against Unemployment, 54 THESIS ELEVEN 63-77 (August 1998); Alstott, Work vs. Freedom, supra note 9; 
STANDING, BEYOND THE NEW PATERNALISM, supra note 9; Jose A. Noguera and Daniel Raventos,  Basic Income, 
Social Polarization and the Right to Work,  Paper presented at the 9th International Congress of the Basic Income 
European Network, Geneva, Switzerland, Sept. 12-14, 2002;  Allan Sheahen Does Everyone Have the Right to a 
Basic Income Guarantee? U.S. Basic Income Guarantee Network Discussion Paper No. 68 (January 2004) at 
http://www.usbig.net/; Jose Luis Rey Perez, El Derecho Al Trabajo, ¿Forma De Exclusión Social? Las Rentas 
Mínimas De Integración Y La Propuesta Del Ingreso Básico, REVISTA ICADE (forthcoming).
43 See, e.g., Widerquist and Lewis, supra note 42 at 28; Noguera and Raventos, supra note 42 at 15; Sheahen, supra
note 42 at 15.
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wouldn’t matter how those jobs were distributed between supervisory and non-supervisory 
positions, between production and support functions (such as the provision of child-care), or 
between program jobs and private sector jobs created to supply the program with materials.44
Second, BI advocates also fail to take into account that an EA program’s net cost would 
be reduced by the taxes program participants would pay on the wages they earned and by any 
revenue generated by selling the program’s output – even if that output were sold at prices below 
its cost of production.   The real per-person cost of creating the jobs needed to secure the right to 
work does not consist of the average total wages and benefits paid to program participants and to 
private sector employees hired to provide materials or services to the program.  It consists of 
average after-tax wages minus average per-worker revenue generated by the sale of program 
output.45  The program’s net cost also would be reduced by savings in public assistance budgets, 
but BI advocates do count on these savings in estimating the cost of a BI guarantee and 
presumably recognize that they would reduce the cost of an EA guarantee as well.
Third, and most importantly, BI advocates ignore the difference between the individual 
cost of providing either a job or BI grant to one person and the aggregate cost of providing either 
jobs or BI grants to everyone who would be eligible to receive the benefit.  Even if the net cost 
of providing a person a job far exceeded the net cost of providing that same person a BI grant, , 
the number of jobs that would have to be created would be limited to the size of the economy’s 
job gap whereas BI grants, in the form preferred by most BI advocates, would have to be paid to 
all members of society.  The arithmetic is simple.  Involuntarily unemployed workers comprise a 
relatively small fraction of a society’s total work force.  Even in a deep recession the number of 
jobs needed to close the economy’s job gap in developed market economies is unlikely to exceed 
10% of the economy’s labor force.  In poorer countries the gap is often higher, but it usually does 
not exceed 25% of the labor force.  If unemployment were measured as a percentage of total 
population rather than as a percentage of the active labor force, these percentages would be far 
smaller.  Even if jobs paying wages several times as large as a BI guarantee were provided to all 
unemployed job seekers, the total cost of doing so would be tiny compared to the cost of 
providing BI grants to all members of society.
To illustrate the relative cost of the two strategies I shall compare equally expansive 
versions of each – proposals designed to eliminate “official” poverty in the United States.  As an 
example of the BI strategy I shall rely on an estimate developed by Charles Clark.46  As an 
example of the EA strategy I shall rely on my own previously published estimate of the cost of 
44 See HARVEY, SECURING THE RIGHT TO EMPLOYMENT, supra note 18, at 39-43.
45 Id. at 21-50; Philip Harvey, Paying for Full Employment: A Hard-Nosed Look at Finances, SOC. POL’Y (Spring 
1995).
46
 Charles M.A. Clark, Promoting Economic Equity: The Basic Income Approach, in INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND 
ECONOMIC POLICY 133, 149-52 (Marc R. Tool and Paul Dale Bush, eds., 2003).
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an EA program designed to secure the right to work,47 supplemented by a rough estimate of the 
cost of expanding transfer programs in the United States to guarantee at least a poverty-level 
income to all persons unable to earn a livelihood through wage employment.
The BI Strategy:  Clark has estimated the cost of a BI guarantee designed to provide all 
residents of the United States with an income at least equal to the federal poverty line.  The 
benefit levels and cost of such a program in 1999 are summarized in Table 1.
To pay for the program, Clark assumes that all federal expenditures on income security 
except for pensions and Social Security benefits48 would be eliminated, which would have saved 
the federal government approximately $238 billion in 1999,49 while all other federal functions 
and expenditure levels would remain unchanged, resulting in the overall federal budget figures 
summarized in Table 2.
47 HARVEY, SECURING THE RIGHT TO EMPLOYMENT, supra note 44, at 21-50.  
48
  These include old age, survivors and disability benefits and health insurance for the elderly and disabled.
49
 This figure seems high to me, but its exact size does not greatly affect Clark’s estimate of government 
expenditures following adoption of a BI program.
Table 1
Estimated Costs of BI Payments, 1999
Age Payment Population Costs
($ Millions) ($ Millions)
Under 18 $3,500 70.2 245,697
Adult $8,667 167.95 1,455,640
Over 65$7,990 34.54 275,975
Total 1,977,311
Source: Clark, supra note 46, at 150
Table 2
Estimated Federal Budget Including BI Guarantee Payments, 1999 ($ Millions)
BI Payments 1,977,311
Other Expenditures 1,465,333
Total Federal Expenditures 3,442,644
Source: Clark, supra note 46, at 150
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Thus, paying for Clark’s hypothetical BI grant program would have approximately 
doubled actual federal expenditures in 1999 from $1.7 trillion to $3.4 trillion.  To support this 
increase in spending, he proposes that the current federal income tax be replaced with a flat tax 
on all income, without any deductions except for the BI payments themselves.  By equalizing tax
rates on all market income, this funding mechanism tends to minimize the maximum tax rate 
imposed.  Other funding schemes are possible, of course, but this one has the virtue of allowing 
easy comparisons of average tax burdens for different social welfare schemes.  Clark estimates 
that a flat rate of 35.8% would have been needed to produce the revenue required to fund the BI 
guarantee he describes along with all other federal government functions in 1999.  
It should be noted, however, that this figure does not include wage earner liability for 
mandatory social insurance (FICA) contributions or for state and local income taxes.  The FICA 
contribution rate on covered income in 1999 was 7.65%, and state and local income taxes would 
have added the equivalent of another 2.7% to the federal flat rate.50  Thus, under Clark’s 
proposal, wage earners would have faced an overall flat tax liability of 46.2% on their wage 
income (starting with their first dollar earned) up to the FICA maximum, which was $72,600 in 
1999.
Clark’s funding analysis also fails to take into consideration the program’s possible 
effects on labor force participation and national income, and hence on the tax base supporting the 
BI program and other government expenditures.  The size of this effect is difficult to predict and 
50
 Clark suggests that state and local governments would enjoy substantial savings as a result of the adoption of a BI 
guarantee program, but this seems doubtful.  Income security expenditures (other than for health care) comprise a 
very small portion of state and local budgets funded from their own sources of revenue (rather than from federal 
grants in aid). Expenditures for means-tested cash and food benefits cost state and local governments only about $23 
billion in revenue from their own sources in 1998 and unemployment compensation benefits cost only another$17.8 
billion.  Together these expenditures required less than 3% of all revenues generated by state and local sources.
Table 3
Estimated Flat Tax Rates on Wage Income (up to FICA Maximums)
with BI Guarantee In Place, 1999
Federal Income Tax 35.8%
Federal FICA Tax   7.7%
State & Local Income Taxes   2.7%
Total Tax Liability 46.2%
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may not be large,51 but if the program did reduce labor force participation and/or national 
income, the flat tax rate required to fund the program would be higher than Clark’s estimate.52
The Universal Declaration Strategy:   In a 1989 book I estimated what it would have cost 
the United States government to secure the right to work by means of direct job creation for the 
10-year period between 1977 and 1986.53  The national unemployment rate during that period 
averaged 7.0 percent, the third highest 10-year average in over a century, so the cost of an EA 
program capable of securing the right to work in such a period overstates the likely cost of such 
an undertaking in better times such as 1999 when unemployment averaged only 4.2% in the 
United States.
The hypothetical EA program whose cost I estimated would have created enough jobs to 
eliminate involuntary part-time employment while reducing official unemployment to the 2% 
level for an enlarged labor force that I assumed would include able-bodied public assistance 
(AFDC) recipients and discouraged workers as well as officially unemployed workers.  I 
estimated that such a program would have needed to create an average of 8.2 million jobs per 
year over the 10-year estimation period, ranging from a low of 7.4 million in 1979 to a high of 
51
 Robert M. Solow, Forward to Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers (Eds.), WHAT’S WRONG WITH A FREE LUNCH ix-xvi 
(2001); Karl Widerquist, A Failure to Communicate: The Labour Market Findings of the Negative Income Tax 
Experiments and Their Effects on Policy and Public Opinion, Paper presented at the 9th International Congress of the 
Basic Income European Network, Geneva, Switzerland, September 2002.
52 The likely effect of a BI guarantee on labor-force participation is hard to analyze, because the direction, size and 
intensity of its substitution and income effects would vary for different categories of workers or potential workers.  
A benefit program’s “substitution effect” is its tendency to influence the number of hours a person wants to work by 
changing the effective wage rates the person can earn from wage labor.  This substitution effect can be produced 
either by the structure of the benefit or of the tax payments required to fund the benefit, because either can affect the 
net income (i.e., the effective wage rate) a person receives for additional hours of work.  A benefit program’s 
“income effect” is its tendency to reduce desired hours of labor because receipt of the benefit makes people feel they 
can “afford” to work less (as happens, for example, when people begin receiving Social Security benefits).  As with 
the substitution effect, tax liabilities attributable to a benefit program must be taken into consideration in assessing 
its income effect in addition to the structure of the benefit itself.  
Further complicating the analysis of work incentives, people may have a tendency to attach greater value to 
threatened income losses than they do to promised income gains, while a particular transaction may be perceived as 
either a gain or a loss depending on how it is “framed” (i.e., perceived in context). See Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).  Thus, even workers 
who would gain more from their BI grant than they would lose in taxed wage income might react to the wage loss as 
though it had reduced their income.  In short, even a painstaking analysis of a BI guarantee program’s likely effect 
on wage rates and income levels may not tell us what the program’s effect on labor force participation would be.
Finally, even if we knew the program’s precise effect on labor force participation rates, we still wouldn’t know for 
certain what effect those changes would have on program finances.  What we really need to know is the program’s 
likely effect on national income, that is, on the tax base that would support the program under Clark’s proposal.  
Changes in labor force participation could affect national income, but the relationship is not necessarily 
straightforward and requires analysis.
53 HARVEY, SECURING THE RIGHT TO EMPLOYMENT, supra note 18.
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13.6 million in 1983.  Figure 2 shows the distribution of those jobs among assumed program 
participants.  About three fifths of the jobs would have gone to officially unemployed workers.  
The rest would have been divided among involuntary part-time workers, AFDC recipients not 
already counted as unemployed, and discouraged workers.
I assumed the program would have paid market wages, which I defined as the wage 
unsuccessful job seekers reasonably could expect to receive if enough additional jobs became 
available at existing wage rates to employ them all.  For officially unemployed persons, I 
assumed this would average 79% of the average hourly wage earned by non-supervisory and 
production workers in the United States as a whole.  This estimate was based on a 1976 survey 
of unemployed persons that found this to be the average last wage they actually had earned prior 
to becoming unemployed.  For other program participants (involuntary part-time workers, AFDC 
parents and discouraged workers) I assumed that average program wages would equal the 
average hourly earnings of part-time workers in the United States as a whole.  
Based on these assumptions, program wages expressed in mid 2004 dollars would have 
averaged $11.82 per hour for officially unemployed persons and $7.93 per hour for other 
program participants.  Not all program participants would have earned these wages.  Based on 
Figure 2
Estimated Number of Jobs Needed to Secure the
Right to Work, 1977-1986 (thousands)
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their experience and skills, many would have qualified only for minimum wage jobs ($5.15 per 
hour in 2004).  I merely assumed that the cited figures would have been the arithmetic average 
wages paid by a program that paid market wages as I have defined that standard.
To guarantee an above-poverty wage for all program participants, I assumed that job 
training followed by a guaranteed job placement would have been offered to all program 
participants who lacked the skills needed to qualify for a job paying high enough wages to 
generate an income above the poverty line, but the same objective could be achieved by offering 
wage supplements such as those provided under the Earned Income Tax Credit program.
Table 4 contains a summary of other assumed program characteristics.  I assumed the 
program would have offered 40-hour-per-week jobs to participants who wanted to work full-
time, and jobs averaging 20 hours per week to participants who wanted to work part-time.  I 
assumed that all participants would have been paid for a full 52 weeks per year (therefore 
allowing for the payment of holiday, vacation, and sick leave at whatever levels were deemed 
appropriate).
Source: (Harvey 2000a)
Source: (Harvey 2000a)
Table 4
Assumptions Underlying Cost Estimate for Direct Job Creation
Program Capable of Securing the Right to Work
Wages: Program participants paid “market wages” averaging $11.21 per hour in 2002 dollars for officially 
unemployed persons and $7.52 per hour in 2002 dollars for other program participants.
Hours: 40 hours per week for persons seeking full-time jobs and 20 hours per week for persons seeking part-time 
jobs.
Taxes: Program wages fully taxable.  Program employment also covered by social security, with program 
participants (and the government as employer) liable for FICA taxes at same rates as other covered 
employees (and employers).
Insurance: Federal employee health insurance benefits provided on same terms as for regular federal employees.
Paid Leave: Medical leave, holidays, and vacation time provided to program participants at whatever level is deemed 
appropriate, with cost of benefit covered by assumption that wages would be paid for a full work year (2080 
hours/year for full-time workers and 1040 hours/hear for part-time workers).
Child Care: Free to all program participants (provided in child care centers operated as employment projects by the 
program).
Services: Free job training and other support services (e.g. substance abuse counseling or sheltered workshop 
assignments) provided to all program participants (with services provided through programs operated as 
employment projects by the program).
Materials: Spending on non-labor costs (facilities, tools, materials, and supplies) assumed to equal 1/3 of program’s 
direct wage bill.
Source: (Harvey 2000a)
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I further assumed that an amount equal to 1/3 of the program's direct wage costs would 
have been spent on facilities, equipment, materials and supplies required to carry out the 
program's work projects.  This was the approximate ratio of non-labor to labor costs in New Deal 
direct job creation programs in the United States during the 1930s.  It also was the approximate 
ratio of non-labor to labor costs in child day care programs operated in the United States during 
the 1980s -- one of the services I assumed the program would produce.  Supervisory and 
administrative costs were assumed to be included in the program’s total wage bill.
I assumed that program wages would have been treated like any other wage income for 
tax purposes (which means the employer share of FICA taxes was counted as an additional 
program cost) and that program participants would have been provided the same health insurance 
benefits as regular federal employees and on the same terms.
Finally, I assumed that free childcare would have been provided by the program to all 
program participants in childcare centers operated by the program as one of its work activities.  
This means the cost of providing child care to program participants would not have added 
anything to the program's total cost.  The same would have been true of a range of other 
employee services -- such as paid job training, substance abuse counseling, and sheltered-
workshop employment for program participants who needed such services.
The estimated year-to-year cost of the program based on these assumptions is shown in 
Figure 3.  Expressed in 1999 dollars, these costs would have averaged of $218 billion per year.  
While large, this level of spending is not unprecedented for a major social insurance benefit.  In 
1986, for example, the jobs program would have cost $146 billion in current dollars compared to 
$194 billion actually spent for Social Security pension benefits.  It also would have cost far less 
than the nearly two trillion dollars required to fund Clark’s proposed BI grant program. 
Figure 3 also includes estimates of certain offsetting savings and revenues that such a 
program would have generated.  The offsetting savings shown in Figure 3 consist of reduced 
spending on cash and in-kind transfer benefits actually provided to able-bodied persons of 
working age and their dependents during the 10-year period.  I estimated that these savings 
would have covered about 60% of total program costs over the 10-year period.  The offsetting 
revenue shown in Figure 3 consists of additional income and payroll tax payments by program 
participants.  I estimated that this revenue would have covered another 20% of the program’s 
total costs during the 10-year period.
As Figure 3 illustrates, the program’s remaining funding deficit (about 20% of total 
program costs) would not have been spread evenly across the 10-year period, but would have 
been concentrated in 1982 and 1983 when the nation’s unemployment rate was elevated by the 
worst recession since the Great Depression. 
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Figure 3
Estimated Cost of Achieving Full Employment
Through Direct Job Creation, 1977-1986 
(billions of 1998 dollars)
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This calls attention to a third source of savings such a program would have generated.  A 
jobs program such as I have described would be a powerful automatic stabilizer -- functioning in 
that respect like the nation's Unemployment Compensation program but with a much stronger 
counter-cyclical impact because of its greater size.  If the program I have described had been in 
place during the 1977-86 period, the deep recession of the early 1980s almost surely would have 
been less severe.  This, in turn, would have resulted in lower program costs and a smaller 
program deficit.  It also would have resulted in substantial increases in government tax receipts 
during the period -- additional revenues that reasonably could have been attributed to the jobs 
program.  I did not try to estimate what the program’s likely counter-cyclical effect would have 
been.  Nor did I try to estimate the savings and revenues likely to have resulted from that effect, 
but they could have been substantial.  
It is significant to note in this regard, that prior to the recession of the early 1980s, the 
program would have had virtually no budget deficit after taking into consideration transfer 
benefit savings and additional income tax revenues attributable to it.  This is attributable to two 
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factors.  The first is that unemployment rates were lower during this period, averaging 6.3% 
between 1977 and 1979 compared to 7.4% during 1980 and 1981, 9.7% during 1982 and 1983, 
and 7.2% between 1984 and 1986.  The other reason is that spending on social welfare benefits 
for jobless individuals was greater during the late 1970s than following the budget cuts instituted 
at the beginning of the Reagan administration.
A fourth source of savings attributable to the program would have consisted of reductions 
in government spending for items other than transfer benefits.  Joblessness has been shown to 
contribute to a range of social and medical problems that impose significant costs on 
governments other than the payment of transfer benefits.   These problems range from increased 
criminal activity to increased heart disease.54  A jobs program that reduced unemployment to 
genuinely voluntary levels almost surely would have produced savings in budget areas not 
included in the estimate of transfer program savings shown in Figure 3.
Finally, my cost estimate for the program was based on the assumption that everything 
the program produced would have been given away for free.  Such a policy is certainly not 
required, and there is no reason to believe it is desirable.  If the program sold some of its output, 
even at deeply discounted prices, the program’s funding deficit would have been reduced. In 
deciding what, if anything, to charge for the goods and services produced by such a program, 
fiscal policy considerations could play a role.  For example, if it were considered desirable that 
the program be fiscally neutral compared to current levels of taxation and government spending, 
prices for program outputs could be set at a level calculated to achieve that goal.  Given the 
relatively small size of such a program's likely funding deficit (after taking into account other 
sources of savings and revenue) that particular goal should be easy to achieve.  In fact, my 
analysis suggests that such a program is more likely to save governments money than to require
additional outlays, in which case fiscal neutrality would require either additional government 
spending for other purposes or a tax cut. 
In short, I think it is reasonable to assume that the right to work could be guaranteed 
without imposing additional fiscal burdens on federal, state or local governments in the United 
States.  In other words, a program securing the right to work like the one I have described 
probably could have been funded in 1999 without any increase in federal, state or local tax rates 
compared to their actual level that year.
To complete our estimate of the comparative cost of equivalent BI and EA guarantees, 
however, we also must estimate the cost of guaranteeing an above-poverty-level income for 
persons who would not have been able to earn an above-poverty level income in 1999 by 
exercising their right to work.  This sum would have to be added to the cost of operating an EA 
program for official poverty to be eliminated.  A rough measure of this sum is the nation’s 
aggregate poverty gap – the total amount of money needed to raise the income of all persons 
54  For citations to some of the literature describing the negative effects of unemployment, see Harvey Combating 
Joblessness, supra note 15, at 679-80 nn.4-9.
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living in poverty to the federal government’s applicable poverty thresholds.  In 1999 this amount 
was $79.5 billion.  This figure actually overstates the amount of additional aid that persons not 
expected to work in 1999 would have needed to increase their income to the poverty threshold, 
because it includes the income needs of the “working poor” and of other persons who would 
have earned at least a poverty level income that year if the right to work had been guaranteed.  
However, if wage supplements had been used to guarantee all workers at least a poverty-line 
income instead of the training measures I have proposed, this figure would approximate the 
amount needed to fund the required wage subsidies as well as the additional income assistance 
benefits needed for non-workers and their dependents.
Funding this level of additional public aid would have required a 1.6 percentage point 
increase in individual and corporate federal tax rates in 1999.  For purposes of comparison, if the 
tax system proposed by Clark were adopted, a flat tax rate of only 12.7% would have been 
required to balance the federal budget, compared to the 35.8% rate required to fund a comparable 
BI guarantee.  A BI guarantee would provide other benefits, of course, but so would a strategy 
founded on an EA guarantee, especially if the extra $1.7 trillion a BI guarantee would have cost 
in 1999 were allocated instead to expanding other economic and social entitlements.  Under 
Clark’s proposal, overall expenditures by all levels of government would have increased from 
about 30% of gross domestic product in 1999, the lowest level of any industrialized country, to 
about 49% of gross domestic product, roughly comparable to the level found in the highest 
spending European welfare states, but without providing the full range or quality of social 
services enjoyed by the residents of those nations.55
A BI guarantee may be desirable, but it isn’t the only desirable social welfare benefit 
governments can provide, and it wouldn’t satisfy all of the social welfare obligations that 
documents like the Universal Declaration ascribe to governments.  If there are social welfare 
benefits other than a BI guarantee that the United States arguably should be providing but 
currently is not providing (e.g., health insurance for persons who now lack it, a reasonable level 
of child care benefits for working parents, or enough educational assistance to equalize 
educational opportunities for children in rich and poor communities) the additional cost of 
providing those benefits should be considered before concluding that the BI strategy for ending 
poverty is economically viable or, if viable, preferable to the far less costly strategy of ending 
poverty using an EA guarantee and conventional transfer programs.
The difference in cost between the two strategies would not be as stark, of course, for 
other types of BI guarantee.  A negative income tax with very high effective marginal tax rates 
on other income might even cost less than a job guarantee.  It would depend on whether the 
benefit was calculated and paid on an individual or household basis.  But for BI advocates who 
55 Barbara Bergmann, A Swedish-Style Welfare State or Basic Income: Which Should Have Priority?, in
REDESIGNING DISTRIBUTION: BASIC INCOME AND STAKEHOLDER GRANTS AS DESIGNS FOR A MORE EGALITARIAN 
CAPITALISM 107-16 (Erik Olin Wright, ed., forthcoming), available at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/RUP-vol-
V.pdf .
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favor a system of universal, unconditional BI grants, the conclusion is inescapable that a BI 
guarantee would be far more expensive than an EA guarantee combined with an income 
guarantee for persons who are unable to work.
Compensating the Unemployed
The likely effect of a BI guarantee on unemployment rates, like its effect on labor force 
participation rates, is hard to predict, but there is no reason to expect such a program to eliminate 
involuntary unemployment or even reduce unemployment rates, and I do not understand BI  
advocates as arguing that it would.  Their argument is that receipt of a guaranteed basic income 
would provide the unemployed with a close or possibly even superior equivalent of wage 
employment, thereby compensating them for their unemployment.56
I believe BI advocates have been too quick to accept this argument.  Consider two 
workers living in a world with Clark’s proposed BI grant system in place.  Both are employed; 
then one of them is laid off and suffers involuntarily unemployment.  Does the unemployed 
worker’s receipt of a BI guarantee compensate her for what she has lost?  I don’t think so.  To be 
sure, the BI grant she receives prevents her from falling into absolute poverty, but she has 
suffered a severe blow to her welfare, losing perhaps half, three quarters or more of her income.  
She is now seriously disadvantaged compared to her former co-worker.  In truth, the BI grant she 
receives gives her nothing to compensate her for her loss, because she already received the full 
grant before she was laid off.  Her former co-worker, on the other hand, receives the same BI 
grant that she does, plus the income from his job, any non-pecuniary benefits his job may 
provide, and the option to voluntarily quit if he wants to live on his BI grant alone.  He has 
choices.  She does not.  If the laid-off worker’s right to work had been secured by an EA 
guarantee, she still might be laid-off, but another job providing approximately equivalent 
opportunities would be available to her.  Her deprivation would be minimized and quickly 
repaired. 
Now consider a second pair of workers.  Actually they’re aspiring workers.  Both are new 
entrants to the labor force, but only one finds a job.  Fill in the blanks.  The story is the same.  
The fact that the youth who fails to find a job continues to receive a BI grant prevents her from 
falling into absolute poverty, but it hardly compensates her for the deprivation of her right to 
work.  Securing the right to work would prevent this harm entirely by ensuring that both youths 
could find work.  My point is simple.  Providing everyone in society a BI grant is a poor 
substitute for securing their right to work. 
56 See, e.g., VAN PARIJS, REAL FREEDOM FOR ALL, supra note 9, at 126; STANDING, BEYOND THE NEW 
PATERNALISM, supra note 9, at 255-261; Perez, supra note 42.
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Other Perceived Benefits of A BI Guarantee
So far I have discussed the effectiveness of an expansive BI guarantee as an anti-poverty 
measure and as an alternative to an EA guarantee.  In this section of the article I shall consider 
four other benefits BI advocates commonly claim for the strategy -- its superiority to conditional 
transfer payments, its ability to compensate non-market work such as family care activities or 
community service, the support it would provide for individual freedom and personal 
development, and its ability to allow workers to refuse sub-standard jobs, thereby pressuring 
low-wage employers to improve the quality of the jobs they offer. 
BI Guarantees and Conditional Transfer Payments:  It undoubtedly would be easier to 
write a couple of hundred million checks each month than to administer both a jobs program 
designed to secure the right to work and a screening process capable of determining fairly and
accurately who is entitled to income support without working.  If, however, the establishment of 
a BI guarantee program would not relieve society of its obligation to secure the right to work – as 
I have argued it would not – this advantage would be reduced to avoiding the difficulty of having 
to decide who is entitled to income support without having to work.  
In discussing the superiority of a BI guarantee in this regard, BI advocates limit their 
discussion almost entirely to means-tested public assistance programs.  Not having to decide who 
is “deserving” of such aid would indeed be a major advantage.  The question of who among the 
poor should receive public aid has been a deeply rancorous and divisive issue in market societies 
for centuries,57 and even after policy decisions have been made concerning eligibility 
requirements, the agencies assigned the task of implementing those policies may lack the 
administrative capacity to make the necessary determinations.  They may even actively subvert 
the policies they are supposed to implement.58
In analyzing the severity of this problem, however, it is important to note that both public 
policy debate in this area and the administration of public assistance law has always been carried 
on in an environment in which the right to work has not been secured.  In that environment, the 
issue of who should be provided income assistance has always been dominated by disagreements 
over the causes and appropriate policy responses to the problem of joblessness.  The economy’s 
failure to provide decent work paying wages capable of supporting a dignified existence for 
everyone willing to accept such employment has inspired “liberals” (in the current American 
sense of the term) to push for public assistance policies that offer support to larger numbers of 
people with fewer conditions attached.  Conservatives, on the other hand, have pushed just as 
hard for public assistance policies that deny public aid to the “able-bodied poor” because they 
believe joblessness is caused by the behavioral shortcomings of jobless individuals themselves 
57 MICHAEL KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA (1986); 
Philip Harvey, Joblessness and the Law Before the New Deal, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1 (1999).
58
 For an extended discussion of these issues, see JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP AND WORKFARE IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE: THE PARADOX OF INCLUSION (2004).
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and/or can only be remedied by inducing behavioral change among the jobless poor.59  This has 
created an unbridgeable divide in market economies both in policy debates over who should 
receive public assistance and in the ethos of the agencies that administer public assistance law.
In considering whether the possibility of avoiding these conflicts is worth the high cost of 
a universal BI grant system, we therefore need to consider how guaranteeing the right to work 
would affect policy debates and policy administration in public assistance law.  That’s a big 
topic, deserving more careful treatment than I can give it in this article, but my guess is that the 
availability of decent work for everyone who wants it would greatly reduce the intensity of 
liberal/conservative disputes in this area of public policy.  The reason is simple.  The 
consequences of policy decisions (and of individual administrative decisions) would no longer be 
as momentous for either liberals or conservatives.  If groups denied income assistance were 
offered guaranteed access to decent jobs instead,60 liberals would have far less reason to fear the 
consequences of “losing” a policy debate over the group’s entitlement to income assistance, and 
conservatives also would view the outcome as less momentous, since government would have to 
assume fiscal and administrative responsibility for the group’s support whether or not they were 
deemed entitled to income maintenance benefits.  Indeed, conservatives might even prefer to 
send a particular group checks than to provide them with employment, because the latter would 
be both more expensive (on a per recipient basis) and involve a larger administrative role for 
government.  In that context, I believe it is reasonable to expect policy formation and 
administration to become less problematic.  The positions of liberals and conservatives might 
even flip, with liberals advocating more extensive accommodation of persons with disabilities in 
jobs programs while conservatives argued, on budgetary grounds, that assistance for such 
persons should be limited to cash grants.  
It also is unrealistic to view the BI strategy as providing a complete solution to eligibility 
determination problems.  One of the disadvantages of the BI strategy is that the only way to 
increase income assistance benefits to persons who need more than the BI guarantee would be 
either to increase the size of the guarantee or engage in precisely the kind of eligibility screening 
the BI strategy is designed to avoid. A BI guarantee would not end the relative advantages that 
some groups enjoy nor the relative disadvantages that other groups suffer.  Unless we are 
persuaded that providing a BI guarantee would suffice to “level the playing field” on which 
individuals seek opportunities for personal development and economic gain, we cannot dismiss 
59
 Harvey, Joblessness and the Law Before the New Deal, supra note 57; Philip Harvey, Combating Joblessness, 
supra note 15, at 686-89.
60 It should be emphasized in this context, that the right to work recognized in the Universal Declaration implies an 
obligation on the part of governments to accommodate job seekers who enter the labor market with disadvantages.   
Article 23 states that “everyone” has a right to work, and while that language obviously was not chosen with the 
intent that it be read literally (e.g., as applying to infants) there is no reason to read it as excluding persons with 
disabilities.  In my view, the most reasonable interpretation of the right to work and the right to income recognized 
in the Universal Declaration is that they create overlapping entitlements for persons whose diminished physical, 
cognitive or psychological capacities render them unable to function in “ordinary” jobs.  Such persons are entitled to 
income support, but they also are entitled to have their disabilities accommodated if they want to work – even if it 
would cost society less simply to send them a check. 
30
the possibility that more targeted remedial measures still would be needed to achieve social 
justice in a world with a BI guarantee in place.  Would enactment of a BI really end policy 
debate concerning the extent and nature of society’s obligations to provide special assistance to 
single parents, residents of economically depressed communities, racial minorities, and the 
relatively impoverished (i.e. people living on nothing but their BI guarantee)?  A BI would 
reduce the administrative problems associated with such decision-making, but it would not 
eliminate them entirely.
Finally, the right to “security” recognized in Article 25 of the Universal Declaration 
arguably imposes an obligation on society not just to prevent people from falling into poverty but 
to ensure the availability of pension and insurance benefits that protect their standard of living 
when a “breadwinner’s” support is lost due to involuntary unemployment, sickness, disability, 
death, pregnancy, family care duties or old age.  I already have noted the limited ability of a 
universal BI grant system to compensate involuntarily unemployed individuals for their lack of 
work, but the same analysis would apply with equal force to losses of income due to pregnancy, 
disability, old age or other causes beyond individual control.  To secure all aspects of the right to 
income support recognized in the Universal Declaration, conditional transfer programs still 
would be needed irrespective of the existence or generosity of a universal BI grant system; and 
that means eligibility criteria for such support still would have to be developed and administered.  
A BI grant system would provide an additional layer of income support, but it would not provide 
an adequate substitute for securing the right to income support and income security recognized in 
the Universal Declaration.
Still, aren’t BI advocates right to point out that a BI guarantee would eliminate the 
stigmatization and administrative “hassles” commonly associated with the receipt of means-
tested public assistance today?  Since “welfare” benefits traditionally are kept at or below the 
subsistence level, a generous BI guarantee could eliminate the need for this type of aid entirely.  
Former public assistance recipients would receive a BI check like everyone else, thereby ending 
the indignities to which they are now subject because of their special status as supplicants for 
public charity.  
This is not a crazy argument, but it ignores the possibility that a universal BI grant system 
might be accompanied by strong social sanctions against “freeloading.”  BI advocates assume 
that a society which instituted a universal BI grant system would not impose social penalties on 
people who chose to live on their BI grant alone – but that’s not necessarily so.  It is just as 
possible that a society which provided a universal BI grant would disdain people who chose to 
live on their grant, using shame and stigma to encourage work effort and discourage 
“freeloading” in the same way it is used today.  If the general public shared the attitude of BI 
advocates towards public assistance recipients, we wouldn’t need to institute a BI guarantee to 
eliminate the stigma and administrative oppression “welfare” programs now generate.  Simply 
imagine what a means-tested public assistance program designed and administered by people 
who share the attitude of BI advocates towards work would look like.  The mistake BI advocates 
make is to assume that their attitude towards work necessarily would triumph if a universal BI 
grant system were instituted, and, on the other hand, that it would be impossible for their attitude 
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towards work to prevail in a society that imposed any conditions on the receipt of public 
assistance.
This does not mean that the idea of providing all members of society an unconditional BI 
guarantee lacks merit.  It only means that the idea of providing such a guarantee need not be 
viewed as an attribute only of universal BI grant and negative income tax proposals.  Traditional 
public assistance programs also could be redesigned to provide benefits that were means-tested 
but not work-tested.  Joel Handler has argued, for example, that the key benefit a BI guarantee 
would provide to public assistance recipients is an “exit option” empowering them to reject 
social services that do not meet their needs or aspirations.  He recognizes that people who need 
public income support also are likely to need a range of social services to achieve their own 
goals for themselves, but that forcing people to accept these services as a condition of their 
receipt of public aid is counterproductive.  It denies independence to people whose capacity for 
independent living is presumed to need development.  It gives too much power to social service 
agencies and too often results in the deterioration of social service delivery into a form of social 
control.61
I find Handler’s argument persuasive, but the kind of BI guarantee required to satisfy his 
concerns need not be provided in the form of either an unconditional grant paid to all members 
of society or a negative income tax.  All that would be required would be for means-tested public 
assistance benefits to be made available without a showing of disability or the imposition of 
work requirements.  This type of public assistance benefit is, in fact, quite common for 
population groups that are not regarded as having a duty to work such as the elderly.  There is no 
reason this list could not be expanded or universalized.  The argument against doing so has 
always been that it would discourage work effort, but the effect of such a benefit has never been 
tested in a context where the right to work was secured for all members of society and where 
social services were made readily available to help people overcome the disabilities and 
disadvantages that limit their opportunities.
Providing a BI guarantee in this form would be relatively inexpensive, and it would 
achieve most of the benefits properly attributable to the BI idea without conflicting with efforts 
to expand other income assistance benefits that would help secure economic and social rights 
recognized in the Universal Declaration – benefits such as paid family leave, genuinely adequate
disability insurance, sabbatical grants, and community service allowances.  Indeed, more 
expansive forms of some of these benefits might be integrated with the kind of reformed public 
assistance program I have described.  The long-term goal of BI advocates in this context still 
could be to universalize eligibility for public assistance benefits over time.  The difference would 
be that they would be advocating reforms in and building upon existing social welfare 
arrangements rather than proposing a wholesale replacement of existing programs with an 
entirely new social welfare system that might or might not secure all of the economic and social 
human rights recognized in the Universal Declaration.
61 HANDLER, supra note 2, at 
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Compensating Non-Market Work: Another advantage claimed for a BI guarantee is that it 
would provide income support for people engaged in work that markets do not compensate (e.g., 
family care work and a wide range of community service activities).  It would do this, however, 
with some of the same limitations noted above in describing the compensation a BI guarantee 
would provide to unemployed individuals.  Consider two individuals living in a world with 
Clark’s proposed BI grant program in place.  The parent, spouse, or child of one of these 
individuals develops a serious illness, and her average working day lengthens to 18 hours.  Does 
her receipt of a BI grant compensate her for this additional work?  No, because she receives 
exactly the same payment she did before her workload increased (and exactly the same 
compensation someone who performed no care work at all would receive.  Her entitlement to  
the same BI grant whether or not she kept her job would make it easier for her to reduce her 
wage employment, because she wouldn’t lose all her income, but her decision to “work less” 
would hardly be unconstrained, since it would involve a very substantial sacrifice in income.  
The same analysis would apply to all other forms of unpaid care work or community service 
activities.
This doesn’t mean a BI guarantee would be worthless to unpaid care and community 
service workers.  A BI guarantee plainly would offer more support for such work than 
governments currently provide.  But it should be clear that a BI guarantee would not give such 
work the same status as paid employment, and this should concern us because the high cost of 
providing such a guarantee, at least in the form of a universal grant, would use up resources that 
otherwise would remain available to support other, possibly superior, means of compensating 
non-market work. 
The Universal Declaration does not expressly mandate that unpaid care work and 
community service work be compensated, but it’s conception of the right to work provides 
strong support for rights-based claims of entitlement to such compensation.  Paragraph 2 of 
Article 23, asserts that “[e]veryone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for 
equal work.”62  Although the drafters of the Declaration were clearly thinking of wage 
discrimination when they drafted this provision,63 there is no principled reason to view the equal 
pay mandate as limited to wage employment.  Expanding the common understanding of the 
Declaration’s equal pay provision to include a right to compensation for currently unpaid care 
work and community service activities poses both theoretical and practical challenges.  What 
kinds of work should be deemed to deserve compensation, and what kinds of mechanisms can be 
devised to provide the compensation?  But these are challenges that human rights advocates 
62
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 23, art. 23.
63 Feminists were both active and influential in their lobbying efforts during the drafting process, succeeding, for 
the most part, in keeping sexist language and sexist distinctions out of the document (the most obvious exception 
being references to “himself and his family” in Articles 23 and 25).  The “equal pay for equal work” provision in 
Article 23 was one of the passages on which women’s organizations concentrated during the drafting process.  See
MORSINK, supra  note 31, at 116-129.
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should welcome.64
  As Standing points out, small steps in this direction already have been taken in some 
countries – through legislation providing for paid parental leave, publicly-funded child care, and 
care-giver allowances – but many questions exist as to the best way of securing compensation for 
care work without reinforcing traditional gender rolls or the social isolation of care workers.65
Reasonable mechanisms for compensating community service activities are easier to envision, 
but the task of deciding which activities are deserving of such compensation is probably more 
challenging than for care work.
A universal and unconditional BI grant would be a mixed blessing in the pursuit of these 
goals.  It would provide income support to persons performing currently uncompensated care and 
community service work, but its universal and unconditional character would make it a 
particularly  ill-suited vehicle to achieve equal pay for this work.  Moreover, since achieving the 
equal pay goal undoubtedly would require expanded public funding (over and above what the BI 
grant system would cost) the fiscal demands of a BI guarantee may mean that pursuing the BI 
strategy could make it more difficult rather than easier to address this problem.  
The alternative arguably mandated by the Universal Declaration is to provide public 
funding for programs designed specifically to compensate currently unpaid care and community 
service workers.  This strategy is hardly perfect, but it would allow not only for this work to be 
compensated, but for it to be done in a way that conformed better to the equal pay for equal work 
principle – and since securing the right to work would not drain the public fisc as a BI guarantee 
would, it may be a more affordable goal.  Consider, for example, what 1.5 trillion dollars could 
have funded in the way of caregiver and community service subsidies in 1999.  That would have 
been the approximate additional cost of funding Clark’s proposed BI grant system compared to 
the strategy I have proposed for securing the right to work and income.
Personal Development and Freedom:  The most important benefit BI advocates seek to 
secure after poverty reduction is probably an expansion of individual freedom and enhanced 
opportunities for personal development.  A BI guarantee would secure this right, they claim, by 
permitting individuals to refuse wage employment that is not personally satisfying, by providing 
support for unpaid work opportunities that may be more fulfilling than wage employment, by 
subsidizing educational and learning activities, and by allowing increased leisure.  Standing 
64
 One of the advantages of broadly worded declarations of basic rights is that they are subject to more expansive 
interpretation than their drafters contemplated.  The U.S. Constitution has often been described as a “living 
document,” despite its relatively fixed language; and the Universal Declaration undoubtedly will be subject to 
similar reinterpretation as conditions and sensitivities change over time.  Some of these interpretations (or 
reinterpretations) may involve steps backwards, circumscribing rights recognized in the document, but others will 
just as surely move forward, expanding the Declaration’s scope by enlarging common understandings of the rights it 
proclaims to more adequately reflect the document’s underlying principles.
65 STANDING, BEYOND THE NEW PATERNALISM, supra note 9, at 264-70. 
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describes this constellation of opportunities as a “right to occupation” which he distinguishes 
from the entitlement to a “job” promoted by right-to-work advocates.66
Standing’s conception of “occupation” is attractive, and the availability of a BI guarantee 
certainly would give people more freedom than they now enjoy to pursue the goals he describes.  
Still, it is easy to overestimate the effectiveness of a BI guarantee in serving these ends.  
Sensitive to criticism that a BI guarantee would reduce work incentives – thereby wounding the 
economy while discouraging the poor from taking steps to escape poverty or near poverty – BI 
supporters have tried to structure their proposals in ways that tend to minimize the likely effect 
of a BI guarantee on labor force participation.  To the extent these efforts succeed, however, they 
tend to undercut claims that a BI guarantee would also cause people to increase their non-waged 
personal development activities and enjoy more leisure.
If a BI guarantee would not cause wage employment to decline significantly (as BI 
advocates tend to argue when discussing program finances and anti-poverty concerns) it is hard 
to understand how the amount of time people devote to non-wage activities would increase.  If, 
on the other hand, BI advocates believe an income guarantee would cause people to devote more 
time to leisure and personal development activities, they need to incorporate that expectation into 
their program financing proposals.  In short, BI advocates face a conundrum in reconciling their 
desire to make it easier for people to drop out of the wage economy while simultaneously 
maintaining participation levels in that economy.
What is the Universal Declaration’s view of leisure time and personal development 
activities?  First, the Universal Declaration emphatically does recognize personal development as 
a right.  As Morsink has noted, “the right to ‘the full development of the human personality’ was 
seen by most delegates to the committee that drafted the Universal Declaration as a way of 
summarizing all the social, economic, and cultural rights in the Declaration.”67  The phrase “full 
development of the human personality” appears in slightly different form in three of the 
Declaration’s articles (Articles 22, 26 and 29), and its spirit pervades the entire document.68
The Universal Declaration’s conception of personal development is not limited to 
activities pursued during non-wage-laboring time.  Securing the right to work, for example, is 
viewed as essential to that goal, as Kenneth Karst’s comments quoted at the beginning of this 
article illustrate.  On the other hand, the Universal Declaration does recognize that supported 
(i.e., paid) leisure also is essential to individual well-being and personal development.  Article 24 
66 Id., at 255-61.
67 MORSINK, supra  note 31, at 212.
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 The broadest statement is contained in Article 22.  See supra, Box 2.
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states that “[e]veryone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of 
working hours and periodic holidays with pay.”69
This entitlement to supported leisure is not unlimited.  The Universal Declaration does 
not recognize an individual right to as much supported leisure as each person desires; but it does 
recognize that every member of society has a right to “a fair share” of supported leisure.70  In 
deciding how much supported leisure must or should be guaranteed, the Universal Declaration 
strategy, like the BI strategy, requires that a balance be struck between non-income-generating 
activities and income-generating activities.  The difference is that the “fair share” principle 
underlying the Universal Declaration approach makes it easier to construct compensation 
mechanisms that strongly subsidize non-market activities – e.g., fully paid leaves of absence or 
full tuition-assistance benefits.  Since the Universal Declaration strategy assumes these benefits 
will be rationed, there is no reason to design the benefits in a way that will ensure that most 
people will pass up the opportunity, as the BI strategy must do to avoid program-jeopardizing 
declines in labor force participation.  Also, since the benefits are provided to only a fraction of 
the labor force at any one time, they can be far more generous than a BI guarantee could be.  
This does not mean the Universal Declaration strategy would necessarily provide more or better 
support for leisure and personal development activities than a BI guarantee, but it is an open 
question.  BI advocates cannot assume the superiority of their approach.
Low Wage Work:  As noted above, BI advocates have tended to be critical of right to 
work claims and of proposals to secure the right.  Standing provides the most extended and 
forceful of these critiques, his principle objection being that the right to work is freedom-
reducing because it imposes an obligation on people to accept bad jobs rather than freeing them 
from dependency on such employment (as he claims a BI guarantee would).71
In evaluating this criticism it is important to reiterate a point made earlier – namely, that 
right to work and BI proposals are not theoretically incompatible with one another.  There is no 
reason in principle why a society could not provide a BI grant to all persons while also 
guaranteeing employment at decent wages to everyone who wants it.  Moreover, my analysis of 
the cost of securing the right to work suggests that it should be possible to achieve this goal 
69
 The “legislative history” of this provision makes it clear that the purpose of the much criticized reference to 
“periodic holidays with pay” was not to endorse a specific compensation device (as critics have tended to assume) 
but to underscore that leisure must be supported if it is to be universally enjoyed rather than remain a privilege of 
wealth.  See MORSINK, supra note 31, at 185-190.  It also should be noted that the Declaration recognizes this right 
as belonging to everyone, not just to wage laborers.  Consistent with this principal, for example, I would argue that 
parents are entitled to supported leisure time as well as wage laborers.
70
 The first draft of what ultimately became Article 24 stated simply that “[e]veryone has the right to a fair share of 
rest and leisure.”  MORSINK, supra note 31, at 186.  Although this language did not survive the drafting process, the 
“fair share” requirement underlay the drafters’ decision to include language making it clear that leisure time had to 
be supported (i.e., paid) since that is what is required to ensure that everyone will get a “fair share.”  See id., at 185-
190.
71 STANDING, BEYOND THE NEW PATERNALISM, supra note 9, at 247-55.
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without adding to the cost of a BI grant program alone.  For right to work advocates the question 
remains whether the additional benefits a BI guarantee would provide are worth its extra cost, 
but if my analysis of the cost of securing the right to work is correct, BI advocates should face no 
such uncertainty. If the right to work could be secured without adding significantly to the overall 
cost of a hypothetical BI grant program, it is hard to understand why a BI advocate would oppose 
the idea. 
Posing the issue in this way underscores how dependent Standing’s criticism of the right 
to work is on the assumption that it cannot be secured by reasonable means.  If it is possible to 
secure the right to work while simultaneously guaranteeing everyone an unconditional BI 
guarantee, Standing’s charge that policies designed to secure the right to work would be 
freedom-reducing is patently false.  Securing the right to work of a person who also receives a BI 
guarantee obviously would provide the person more life choices than a BI guarantee alone.
Standing does not consider this possibility because he assumes the only means available 
to provide paid employment for everyone who wants it is to lower wages and allow working 
conditions to deteriorate, a strategy he rejects because it sacrifices “more valuable forms of 
security” for employed workers.72  But why assume the only way to expand employment 
opportunities is by lowering wages?73  We don’t expect to secure all the education or healthcare 
society needs by allowing its price to fall and its quality to decline to the point that everyone can 
afford it.  Why should we expect the market to provide all the jobs we need?  Standing fails to 
consider the possibility that, just like education and health care (or a BI guarantee), the right to 
work can be secured only if government itself is willing to fund the jobs that markets fail to 
provide?  Why should it be acceptable, indeed obligatory, for governments to fund education, 
health care (and a BI guarantee), yet unacceptable or impossible for governments to fund the 
additional jobs needed to secure the right to work?
If the right to work can be secured along with adequate income support for persons 
unable to earn a livelihood, the complaint that policies designed to secure the right to work 
impose an obligation on people to work loses its moral force.74  BI advocates do not object to the 
necessity most people face of having to work to earn their livelihood.  They accept that anyone 
who wants more income than a BI guarantee provides should have to work for it, and, as 
explained above, the fiscal viability of their proposals require that almost everyone who currently 
works for wages would continue to do so.  Their moral complaint against “forced work” is based 
72 Id., at 272.
73
 Standing’s assumption that lowering wages would lead to reduced unemployment also can be challenged.  See, 
e.g.,  Harvey, Combatting Joblessness, supra note 15, at 709-23.
74
  Lest there be any misunderstanding, the issue is not whether the Universal Declaration imposes an obligation on 
people to accept wage employment.  It emphatically does not.  Proposals to link the right to work to such an 
obligation were made and expressly rejected in the drafting process.  See MORSINK, supra note 31, at 157-90.  The 
claim I understand BI advocates to be making is that denying income support to individuals who could be self-
supporting is equivalent to imposing an obligation to work on them because, without such support, they will feel 
compelled by material necessity to seek wage employment.
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entirely on the argument that low-wage workers should not be forced to accept bad jobs that pay 
below poverty wages.  A BI guarantee would solve this problem, in their view, by giving low-
wage workers what Standing calls a “drop dead option,”75 the ability to refuse sub-standard 
employment, thereby forcing employers to offer better quality work to attract the labor they 
need. 
Eliminating sub-standard jobs is a laudable goal, but it hardly distinguishes BI proposals 
from the Universal Declaration strategy.  The difference lies in the means adopted to achieve that 
goal and in the fact that the Universal Declaration also proposes to ensure that everyone who 
wants a “good” job (what the International Labor Organization refers to as “decent work”76) is 
able to find one, a goal BI proposals generally ignore.  In fact, there is little doubt that the 
strategy for securing the right to work I described earlier in this article would be more effective 
than a BI guarantee in eliminating bad jobs.  While a BI guarantee might remove the whip of 
absolute necessity that currently forces low-wage workers to accept sub-standard jobs, they still 
might feel a strong compulsion to accept such employment in order to earn an above poverty-line 
income.   Indeed, rather than eliminating “bad” jobs, a BI guarantee might subsidize them, 
allowing employers to lower wages rather than raise them, since low-wage workers would need 
less wage income to survive.  The “exit option” low-wage workers need in order to put pressure 
on employers to eliminate “bad” jobs isn’t a BI guarantee, but a ready supply of “good” jobs, the 
strategy proposed by the Universal Declaration.77
Conclusion
Economists and public officials regularly ask how unemployment can be reduced, how 
employment levels can be raised, and how the employability of disadvantaged workers can be 
enhanced; but the policy goal of securing the right to work for everyone who wants to work has 
been virtually abandoned, even by progressives.  Almost no one asks what steps governments 
can or should take to ensure that decent jobs are available for all job seekers.  This goal is 
assumed to be beyond the reach of public policy, with “full employment” reconceived as the 
minimum level of unemployment consistent with price stability (rather than the level required to 
secure the right to work).  Policy makers have lowered their sights, with the U.S. economy’s 
achievement of 4 percent unemployment in 2000 widely regarded as just about as good a labor 
market performance as it is possible to achieve – notwithstanding the fact that even then the 
75 STANDING, BEYOND THE NEW PATERNALISM, supra note 9, at 259.
76 INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, A GLOBAL AGENDA FOR EMPLOYMENT (2001).
77
 Indeed, the most significant disadvantage of using direct job creation to secure the right to work is the likelihood 
that the policy’s positive effect on wage rates would prove inflationary.  Reliance on this strategy requires a 
willingness to wrestle with the macroeconomic problems that rising wages can cause rather than tolerate continuing 
violations of the right to work as an acceptable price to pay for price stability.  See Philip Harvey Human Rights and 
Economic Policy Discourse: Taking Economic and Social Rights Seriously, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 363, 
449-67 (2002).
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number of officially unemployed workers and involuntary part-time workers exceeded the 
number of job vacancies by about 4.5 million.78
It is hardly surprising in this environment that many progressives find the BI idea 
attractive.  It promises important benefits that market economies have rarely been able to deliver.  
But if the right to work and income support proclaimed in the Universal Declaration can be 
secured at lower cost than a BI guarantee, the BI idea loses much of its luster.  A society that 
secured the right to work and also provided a BI guarantee still might appeal to many people; but 
there is little doubt that a fair assessment of the comparative advantages of the BI and EA 
strategies in securing the rights recognized in the Universal Declaration favors the latter.
The harder question to answer is why progressives manifest so little interest in proposals 
actually to secure the right to work.  The attention given to BI proposals in progressive policy 
debates demonstrates that dramatic departures from existing policies can receive a hearing.  Why 
then do policy proposals for securing the right to work attract so little attention?  Explaining this 
conundrum is beyond the scope of this article, but the analysis offered here provides strong 
support for progressives to take EA proposals seriously.
78
  The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) has begun once again to collect and report job vacancy data 
for the U.S. economy after a two decade hiatus.  This data can be accessed at <http://www.bls.gov/jlt/home.htm>.  
Data on unemployment and involuntary part-time employment is reported monthly in Tables A-1 and A-25 of the 
BLS  periodical, Employment and Earnings. 
